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Abstract
This Note argues that recent approaches from the highest courts in
the United States and Canada regarding corporate tort liability for
international human rights abuses are converging to create a set of
influential global norms. This comparative study closely examines the
recent decisions in Nevsun Resources v. Araya, from Canada, and in
Nestlé v. Doe, from the United States. This Note contends that these
two decisions have the potential to clarify how customary international
law should be applied in domestic civil courts to hold corporations liable
for human rights abuses committed abroad.
In Part II, this Note traces the history of corporate liability for
violations of international law, leading up to the present day. In Part
III, this Note analyzes the legal arguments that successfully enable
North American courts to hear tort liability cases against corporations
accused of violating international human rights law, and the arguments
that curry favor with judiciaries to constrain jurisdiction. Part IV
discusses the outcome of the most recent supply chain human rights
litigation pending before the Supreme Court of the United States, and
examines the possibility that a set of principles is emerging due to
transnational judicial dialogue between the two North American high
courts. Finally, this Note concludes with recommendations for judicial
participants, civil society actors, and corporate actors on navigating
what promises to be a new era in international law.
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I. INTRODUCTION1
With the vast increase of businesses operating principally or with
subsidiaries in foreign countries over the past half century, the need to
protect private citizens from corporate abuses has accordingly
increased.2 However, avenues to justice for these citizens have been
1.

“Custos morum” is a Latin phrase meaning “a guardian of (public)
morals.” Chief Justice John Roberts, in his opinion for the Supreme Court
of the United States in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., rejected the
suggestion that the United States should allow broad jurisdiction under
the Alien Tort Statute by quoting Justice Story: “No nation has ever yet
pretended to be the custos morum of the whole world.” Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 123 (2013).

2.

ALEX NEWTON, THE BUSINESS OF HUMAN
THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES 5 (2019).
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limited. Domestic judiciaries have been unwilling or unable to pierce
the corporate veil to find liability, and international law, even in its
most powerful jus cogens form, has been difficult to enforce.3 In this
vacuum of accountability, international organizations have pushed for
the adoption of standards directly addressing corporations’
responsibilities,4 and scholars have proposed mechanisms for victims to
seek redress via arbitration5 or through reparations at the International
Criminal Court.6 However, a powerful option emerged, or rather, was
rediscovered, and gained popularity in the last quarter of the twentieth
century: targeting corporations for tort liability in domestic courts. In
the United States, beginning in the 1980s, the ne plus ultra for human
rights activists the world over was the Alien Tort Statute,7 a statutory
grant of jurisdiction in American courts for foreigners seeking redress
for violations of international law.8 Ultimately, and perhaps
unsurprisingly, political and corporate interests attacked the Alien Tort
Statute.9 After several decades of modest success in reaching redress for
victims of human rights abuses, beginning with Filártiga v. Peña-Irala
in 1980,10 many observers worried that the Supreme Court of the United

3.

See generally Jason MacLean & Chris Tollefson, Foreign Wrongs,
Corporate Rights, and the Arc of Transnational Law, in CORPORATE
CITIZEN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE GLOBALIZED RULE OF LAW 31, 32
(Oonagh E. Fitzgerald ed., 2020) (describing the historical difficulty of
enforcing international law to bring corporate defendants to account).

4.

U.N. Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04, at 13 (2011)
[hereinafter Guiding Principles].

5.

See Claudia Annacker et al., Alert Memorandum: The Launch of the
Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration, CLEARY
GOTTLIEB (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files
/alert-memos-2020/the-launch-of-the-hague-rules-on-business-and-human
-rights-arbitration.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XVH-Z7XY] [hereinafter
Launch of the Hague Rules] (describing the best practices and emerging
norms around arbitration in contexts where human rights issues are
implicated).

6.

See generally Hannibal Travis, Reparations for Mass Atrocities as a Path
to Peace: After Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Can Victims Seek
Relief at the International Criminal Court?, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 547
(2015).

7.

Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.

8.

Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1467, 1470 (2014).

9.

Travis, supra note 6, at 549–50.

10.

Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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States had decisively closed the door on Alien Tort Statute litigation
with its 2013 decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.11
Kiobel certainly chilled the ability to bring tort claims for alleged
human rights abuses in the United States, but there is a potential thaw
on the horizon. This note argues that two decisions from North
American high courts, Nestlé v. Doe12 and Nevsun Resources v. Araya,13
can clarify the application of customary international law via domestic
tort proceedings in North America, and perhaps beyond. In Nestlé v.
Doe, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to deny
American courts the jurisdiction to litigate a human rights complaint
from a foreign national against a domestic, American corporation.14
Similarly, in Nevsun Resources, the Supreme Court of Canada held that
due to the Canadian Constitution’s incorporation of customary
international law, Canadian domestic courts are a proper forum to hear
human rights complaints from foreign nationals against Canadian
parent corporations of foreign subsidiaries.15
These two decisions represent an inflection point for the role of
domestic legal systems in applying customary international law to
corporate persons. First, the cases provide a map from two North
American judiciaries to their respective polities (and each other,
through transnational judicial dialogue) of how to successfully bring
such claims. Second, this clarification of the role of domestic courts can
provide needed guidance to corporate actors in the absence of
enforceable hard law. Increasing the efficacy of customary international
law to hold corporations liable for human rights abuses committed
abroad can become a powerful deterrent for corporations tempted to
cut corners by directly engaging in, or aiding and abetting, harmful
practices in foreign countries.16
In Part II, this Note traces the history of corporate liability for
violations of international law leading up to the present. In Part III,
this Note analyzes the legal arguments that successfully enable North
American courts to hear tort liability cases against corporations accused
11.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).

12.

Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021).

13.

Nevsun Res. Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5, 183, [2020] 443 D.L.R. 4th
(Can.).

14.

Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I, 141 S. Ct. 188 (2020); see also Doe I v. Nestlé
USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014), for the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruling.

15.

Nevsun, 2020 SCC 5 at 132.

16.

See Michael J. Kelly, Prosecuting Corporations for Genocide Under
International Law, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 339, 357 (2012) (analogizing
corporate liability to military command responsibility theory and
respondeat superior in deterrent effectiveness).
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of violating international human rights law, and the arguments that
curry favor with judiciaries to constrain jurisdiction. Part IV discusses
the latest Alien Tort Statute decision before the Supreme Court of the
United States and examines the evidence that a set of principles is
emerging due to transnational judicial dialogue between the two North
American high courts. Finally, this Note concludes with
recommendations on how judicial participants, civil society actors, and
scholars can position their arguments to meet the standards that the
North American high courts have indicated are necessary to secure
domestic fora. In addition, this Note suggests that corporate actors
would be well suited by minding these standards closely. Amid
increasing calls from consumers and civil society for supply chain
transparency, it will be easier to spot behavior that violates
international human rights law, and corporate actors will understand
to avoid liability by complying with clear, enforceable law.17

II. Background
A. Corporate Liability Under Customary International Law: A Brief
History

Corporate liability for human rights abuses is rooted in customary
international law. Customary international law arises when an
identifiable general practice by states is broadly accepted as law.18
However, because of challenges with enforcement and consensus,
customary international law is difficult to enforce on the domestic
level.19 In classical international law, States, not corporations, were the
exclusive actors.20 The more recent rise of corporate personhood in
many jurisdictions, including the United States, suggests that just as
natural persons can violate laws and be held accountable, so too can
corporate persons.21
Corporate liability for human rights violations continued to develop
within the rapid evolution of an international law and human rights
17.

See Verónica H. Villena & Dennis A. Gioia, A More Sustainable Supply
Chain, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2020, at 84, 86.

18.

Noah A. Bialos, The Identification of Customary International Law:
Institutional and Methodological Pluralism in U.S. Courts, 21 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 1, 3 (2020).

19.

Id. at 35.

20.

MacLean & Tollefson, supra note 3, at 45.

21.

See YEMEN ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, AIDING & ABETTING: HOLDING
STATES, CORPORATIONS, AND INDIVIDUALS ACCOUNTABLE FOR WAR
CRIMES IN YEMEN 46 (2020); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (holding that First Amendment
protections in the United States apply both to natural persons and
corporate persons).
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regime after World War II. Before 1945, although there was a general
consensus on the historical law of nations,22 there was no definitive
consensus on international human rights law.23 The post-war tribunals
conducted by the Allies, and the formation of the United Nations in
1945 changed this decisively.24 The explosion of international law
agreements and treaties immediately following World War II created a
regime of international law in what international law scholars have
called a Grotian moment: “an instance in which there is such a
fundamental change to the international system that a new principle of
customary international law can arise with exceptional velocity.”25
Here, the fundamental change to the international system was the
carnage of World War II, and the new principle of customary
international law was the establishment of the international human
rights regime.26
In 1948, shortly after the establishment of the United Nations, its
Member States signed onto the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”).27 While the UDHR was at the time a nonbinding expression
of shared fundamental rights, it has since blossomed into a set of
binding norms of international law, and become the de facto linchpin
of the international human rights legal regime.28 This new regime grew
from and explicitly understood corporations’ obligation to follow
international law after several war crimes prosecutions of heads of
corporations that provided arms, materiel, and other assistance to Axis
powers during World War II.29
22.

Stephens, supra note 8, at 1470.

23.

See generally MICHAEL P. SCHARF, MILENA STERIO & PAUL R. WILLIAMS,
THE SYRIAN CONFLICT’S IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 19–29 (2020).

24.

U.N. Charter. The very first sentence of the Charter reflects the desire
“to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in
our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.” Id. at pmbl.

25.

SCHARF, STERIO & WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 23.

26.

See id. at 19–28, for a review of the international human rights regime
that emerged after World War II as a blend of treaty-based law and
customary international law.

27.

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter UDHR].

28.

Stephens, supra note 8, at 1475.

29.

Brief of Amici Curiae Nuremberg Scholars in Support of Respondents,
Nestlé USA, Inc., v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021) (Nos. 19-416, 19-453),
2020 WL 6322315; see also James G. Stewart, The Turn to Corporate
Criminal Liability for International Crimes: Transcending the Alien Tort
Statute, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 121, 123 (2014), for a discussion of
World War II prosecutions by the Allied powers against corporations for
pillage during the war.

390

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law VOL. 54 (2022)
A Regional Custos Morum? Corporate Liability Under International Law in North
America After Nevsun Resources and Nestlé

Yet the understanding of corporate liability in the post-World War
II era remains muddled, even among legal scholars. Strictly speaking,
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (“IMT”) only tried
and convicted individuals who acted on behalf of their employer
corporations in aiding and abetting Nazi war crimes.30 However, some
scholars argue that the IMT imposed liability on corporate entities in
addition to individual actors, even if the sanction was extrajudicial.31
In the case of the largest corporation to profit from and prop up the
Nazi regime, I.G. Farben, the IMT punished the chemical and
pharmaceutical conglomerate “with the corporate death penalty—
dissolution—for its participation in violations of international law.”32
As the discussion of current Alien Tort Statute litigation later in this
Note will show, whether corporate liability is part of customary
international law remains far from settled.33
Since the proliferation of human rights treaties and norms in the
latter half of the twentieth century, the regimes backing and enforcing
these norms have lost some of their standing on the world stage.34 The
International Criminal Court, for instance, was established with the
rosy promise of an end to impunity, but has stalled due to States
Parties’ reluctance to relinquish their sovereignty.35 The decline in these
institutions’ effectiveness coincided with the chipping away of the Alien
Tort Statute, the American statute that brought customary
international law into U.S. federal courts,36 and which is the subject of
the section below.

30.

Robert C. Thompson et al., Translating UNOCAL: The Expanding Web
of Liability for Business Entities Implicated in International Crimes, 40
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 841, 843 (2009).

31.

Tyler Giannini & Susan Farbstein, Corporate Accountability in Conflict
Zones: How Kiobel Undermines the Nuremberg Legacy and Modern
Human Rights, 52 HARV. INT’L. L.J. ONLINE 120, 121 (2010).

32.

Id.

33.

See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141
S. Ct. 1931 (2021) (Nos. 19-416, 19-453), 2020 WL 632231 (2020)
[hereinafter Nestlé v. Doe Transcript].

34.

See Travis, supra note 6, at 569–70, for a discussion of the weakening of
institutions such as the International Criminal Court and the trend
toward impunity for States and other violators of international law.

35.

Id. at 569.

36.

Stephens, supra note 8, at 1467.
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B. North American Approaches to International Law Tort Liability for
Corporations
1. The United States: The Alien Tort Statute

The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) is an American law that, since the
late eighteenth century, has allowed foreign nationals to bring tort
claims in American federal courts.37 The Judiciary Act of 1789, which
established the federal court system in the United States, included the
provision to create federal jurisdiction over “all suits of a civil nature
at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds . . .
five hundred dollars, and . . . [a]n alien is a party” and over “any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”38 The ATS does not create
any new cause of action—relying on cases in tort—but rather extends
jurisdiction of those causes of action to foreigners.39 Notably, aliens were
held in a class distinct from ambassadors, indicating to some observers
that the drafters wished to afford private citizens, not just those with
diplomatic status, the opportunity to seek redress.40
Scholars have also suggested that the drafters intended the ATS to
enforce the law of nations, and to define the torts that violated that
law, as understood and promulgated at the time through the earlier
writing of Grotius and Blackstone.41 While the ATS was unique in its
attention to international law tort violations, it was part of a concerted
effort by the American Founders to vest the federal government, rather
than the states, with the power to regulate foreign affairs for the new
nation.42 In contrast to the present controversy around the statute, at
the time of the ATS’ writing, jurists recognized the binding law of
nations as the law of the United States.43
After its enactment, there was a nearly two-centuries-long gap in
meaningful ATS jurisprudence in the United States, with the statute
being mentioned just twenty-one times from 1789 to 1980.44 Beginning

37.

Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.

38.

The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 77–78 (1789).

39.

Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.

40.

Travis, supra note 6, at 560–62.

41.

Stewart, supra note 29, at 129–30.

42.

Stephens, supra note 8, at 1470 (“In particular, courts and scholars
generally agree that the Framers enacted the ATS in order to provide a
federal court forum in which foreigners could seek remedies for at least
some violations of international law.”).

43.

Id.

44.

Id. at 1472–73.
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in 1980 with the Filártiga45 case, the ATS became the preferred
litigation mechanism for human rights activists.46 The ATS’ grant of
jurisdiction in tort litigation was unique in the world, and offered
plaintiffs an easier pathway than criminal litigation, or any litigation
in oft-compromised domestic judiciaries.47 However, actual results were
mixed. Since Filártiga, the statute has been invoked successfully only a
few dozen times, and then not always ending with judgments but,
typically, with settlements or limited enforceability.48
The Filártiga opinion noted that application of the law of nations
was a federal concern, and the ATS sought to “implement the
constitutional mandate for national control over foreign relations,” but
in the case’s aftermath, the statute became the center of highly
contested disputes over the role of international law in domestic
courts.49 To protect the executive branch’s control over foreign policy,
the Bush and Obama Administrations issued Statements of Interest to
obtain exemptions from constitutional, treaty-based, or statutory law
when government officials, government contractors, or important
foreign policy interests became implicated in ATS cases.50 Courts also
began to invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality in ATS
cases.51 The presumption against extraterritoriality is a canon of judicial
interpretation that states domestic laws are presumed not to apply
outside U.S. territory, but previous jurists had understood the text of
the ATS to explicitly rebut this presumption.52 Scholars were perplexed
by the judiciary’s rejection of extraterritoriality, an abrupt about-face
from its earlier jurisprudence.53
By the time Kiobel came before the Supreme Court of the United
States, opposition to the ATS included powerful multinational
45.

Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).

46.

Stewart, supra note 29, at 130.

47.

Id.

48.

Stephens, supra note 8, at 1472–73; Mia Swart, Requiem for a Dream?:
The Impact of Kiobel on Apartheid Reparation in South Africa, 13 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 353, 362–63 (2015).

49.

Stephens, supra note 8, at 1473.

50.

Travis, supra note 6, at 562; see Swart, supra note 48, at 360.

51.

Travis, supra note 6, at 615 (“The doctrine of non-extraterritoriality has
gutted the ATS, because the statute already had scant application to acts
committed on U.S. territory as a result of U.S. sovereign immunity and
the frequent decision by Congress to limit U.S. residents’ remedies for
domestic violations of the law of nations.”).

52.

JULIA RUTH-MARIA WETZEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS:
TRANSLATING HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS INTO COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
63–65 (2015).

53.

Id. at 62.
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corporations, government officials, and government contractors.54 The
decision in Sosa v. Álvarez-Machaín, the first ATS case to come before
the Supreme Court, had already narrowed the statute and insisted it
was to be applied with extreme caution due to foreign policy
considerations.55 The 2013 decision in Kiobel appeared to be the end for
this jurisdictional approach to remedies for violations of international
law. Just as quickly as the ATS had become a praised route to
international justice for scholars and jurists, U.S. courts made it an
impotent avenue to pursue human rights litigation in the United States.
2. Canada: Doctrine of Adoption Versus the Mining Industry

Canadian law accepts the doctrine of adoption, meaning that
customary international law is automatically adopted into the corpus
of Canada’s common law.56 In theory, this means that a breach of
customary international law by a domestic corporation, wherever in the
world it operates, gives rise to a claim in Canadian courts. In practice,
however, Canadian corporations have opposed application of customary
international law over their actions.
The mining industry in Canada opposes the doctrine of adoption
with a particular ferocity. More mining companies operating
internationally are domiciled in Canada than in any other country,57
representing approximately 75% of all mining companies in the world.58
After the release of the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, civil society actors lobbied the Canadian government for greater
regulation, but the extractive industry insisted that voluntary
mechanisms provided the best governance model.59 Efforts to hold
extractive companies accountable were met with sharp criticism from
the Canadian mining sector, “which argued that it would put Canadian

54.

Travis, supra note 6, at 582–85, 595.

55.

Stephens, supra note 8, at 1468; See also Nestlé v. Doe Transcript, supra
note 33, at 67 (discussing the foreign policy implications that may be
present in ATS litigation).

56.

Nevsun Res. Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5, [2020] 443 D.L.R. 4th, para 127
(Can.).

57.

Mona Paré & Tate Chong, Human Rights Violations and Canadian
Mining Companies: Exploring Access to Justice in Relation to Children’s
Rights, 21 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 908, 908 (2017).

58.

Jolane T. Lauzon, Araya v. Nevsun Resources: Remedies for Victims of
Human Rights Violations Committed by Canadian Mining Companies
Abroad, 31 QUE. J. INT’L L. 143, 146 (2018).

59.

Charis Kamphuis, Canadian Mining Companies and Domestic Law
Reform: A Critical Legal Account, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1459, 1466 (2012).

394

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law VOL. 54 (2022)
A Regional Custos Morum? Corporate Liability Under International Law in North
America After Nevsun Resources and Nestlé

companies at a competitive disadvantage when doing business in
developing countries.”60
Canadian courts have frequently refused to hear human rights cases
involving the business activities of Canadian companies or their foreign
subsidiaries based on the forum non conveniens doctrine, which dictates
that the host state is a more appropriate venue than the corporation’s
home state.61 However, Canadian courts have recently shown greater
inclination to hear these cases if victims’ domestic legal systems refuse
to hold corporations accountable. This was the situation in Choc v.
Hudbay, a case arising in Guatemala where Guatemalan Mayan
Q’eqchi’ plaintiffs sued a Canadian mining company.62 The plaintiffs
did not bring their case in Guatemala due to concerns of corruption in
their domestic judiciary.63 Choc v. Hudbay was the first case in tort
litigation that proceeded to the merits in Canada, with the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice holding that the plaintiffs had a cause of
action for a potentially novel tort claim against the company.64
While Canada’s doctrine of adoption mirrors the ATS in that
customary international law is incorporated into the state’s domestic
legal system, the Canadian system faces the additional hurdle of
creating a cause of action.65 The Supreme Court of the United States
stated that “the common law would provide a cause of action for the
modest number of international violations with a potential for personal
liability at the time [of the ATS’ writing].”66 Scholars argue that
Canadian tort law should adopt novel causes of action based on jus
cogens norms of customary international law.67 The Vienna Convention
established that jus cogens norms are those “recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no

60.

Susana C. Mijares Pena, Human Rights Violations by Canadian
Companies Abroad: Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc., 5 W.J. LEGAL STUD.
4–5 (2014).

61.

Id. at 1.

62.

Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc., [2013] O.N.S.C. 1414 (Can.); Maureen T.
Duffy, Opening the Door a Crack: Possible Domestic Liability for NorthAmerican Multinational Corporations for Human Rights Violations by
Subsidiaries Overseas, 66 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 23, 31 (2015).

63.

Duffy, supra note 62, at 31.

64.

Choc, O.N.S.C 1414, at para. 75.

65.

Id.

66.

Sosa v. Álvarez-Machaín, 542 U.S. 692, 694 (2004).

67.

E. Samuel Farkas, Araya v. Nevsun and the Case for Adopting International
Human Rights Prohibitions into Domestic Tort Law, 76 U. TORONTO FAC.
L. REV. 130, 137 (2018).
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derogation is permitted.”68 In Nevsun Resources v. Araya, the
defendant corporation argued that corporations are not liable under
international law.69 The Supreme Court of Canada held, however, that
although the classical understanding was that state actors are the only
ones bound by jus cogens norms, modern international law does create
liability for corporate actors.70 With this holding, the Supreme Court of
Canada signaled its willingness to create a new cause of action, and to
adopt the view of scholars such as Jolane T. Lauzon, who urge that
“impunity should not be an acceptable outcome and the lack of
available legal tools should not prevent the courts from innovating on
this matter.”71
C. Twenty-First Century Developments in Corporate Liability

The earliest iteration of the international human rights regime
focused on States as the primary, if not exclusive, actors capable of
liability.72 By the turn of the new century, however, a growing body of
scholars and civil society actors recognized the influence of corporate
actors in international relations.73 Consequently, standards and
practices to hold these new actors accountable emerged from the same
bodies, including the United Nations, that had created international
law designed for States just a generation prior. This subsequent
development forms the normative context in which North American
high courts must rule on issues of corporate liability. Nonbinding
frameworks can provide an interpretive gloss reflecting on the domestic
legal systems, creating customary international law at the margins.
1. The U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

In a globalized economy where a single company can operate nearly
everywhere in the world, international standards are particularly
promising as a means to restrain corporate conduct effectively and

68.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.

69.

Nevsun Res. Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5, [2020] 443 D.L.R. 4th 183, para.
105 (Can.).

70.

Id. at para. 113.

71.

Lauzon, supra note 58, at 169.

72.

OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW
A RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD xix (2017).

73.

See, e.g., Bialos, supra note 18, at 1, 4; Isabella D. Bunn, Business and
Human Rights: The Changing Landscape for U.S. Lawyers, 41 HUM. RTS.
23, 23 (2015); Duffy, supra note 62, at 23; Dinah Shelton, Challenging
History: The Role of International Law in the U.S. Legal System, 40 DENV.
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 14–15 (2011).
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consistently.74 In 2011, the United Nations finalized the Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (“U.N. Guiding Principles”),
as the norm of holding companies accountable grew in force.75 The U.N.
Guiding Principles, although nonbinding “recommendations,” represent
the proposition that the international community demands that
companies should be held liable to international and domestic
communities affected by their actions.76
The U.N. Guiding Principles and the accompanying framework are
grouped under three pillars. First, States must protect against human
rights abuses committed by a third-party corporate actor.77 Failure to
prevent, punish, and redress abuses, constitute a breach of the first
pillar.78 Second, businesses should “avoid infringing on the human rights
of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which
they are involved” through due diligence and remediation.79 Third,
victims must have greater access to remedies.80
The U.N. Guiding Principles improve upon their predecessor
attempts, which were criticized by scholars for going excessively far,
and clarify State human rights obligations with regard to threats posed
by businesses.81 However, they only identify a social responsibility of
corporations to respect human rights, rather than a binding obligation
with the force of law.82 It is still States alone that are bound by the first
pillar, and corporations that are rather more vaguely encouraged to
respect the second pillar, a tacit acknowledgement that corporate
responsibility is extralegal. Nevertheless, because the U.N. Guiding
Principles emerged from national and international norms of human
rights, scholars, observers, and the business sector itself are optimistic

74.

NEWTON, supra note 2, at 4.

75.

Jonathan Bonnitcha & Robert McCorquodale, The Concept of ‘Due
Diligence’ in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 899, 900 (2017).

76.

Neriah Yue, The ‘Weaponization’ of Facebook in Myanmar: A Case for
Corporate Criminal Liability, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 813, 821 (2020).

77.

Pierre Thielbörger & Tobias Ackermann, A Treaty on Enforcing Human
Rights Against Business: Closing the Loophole or Getting Stuck in a
Loop?, 24 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 43, 48 (2017).

78.

Id.

79.

Guiding Principles, supra note 4; see also NEWTON, supra note 2, at 6.

80.

Id. at 7.

81.

Thielbörger & Ackermann, supra note 77, at 45.

82.

Id.
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that they will only grow in normative force.83 Because the U.N. Guiding
Principles were adopted unanimously, writes Humberto Cantú Rivera,
they “reflect a common concern and belief of states that the guidelines
contained in the instrument are a globally accepted minimum for the
respect of human rights by corporations.”84 As the acceptance of the
soft law of the U.N. Guiding Principles deepens globally, these
Principles are very likely to become customary international law
themselves.85
While legal mechanisms for holding these actors accountable
continue to develop in domestic courts, corporations expose themselves
to significant reputational risk, if not legal liability, that can increase
their willingness to comply with nonbinding standards.86 Compliance
with the nonbinding standards is as much motivated by financial
incentives as reputational, as “[r]eputational losses invariably lead to
financial losses” including loss of business, and costs to rectify damage
and compensate victims.87
Additionally, it is significant that the U.N. Guiding Principles, and
similar regional frameworks, were developed with the cooperation and
participation of corporations as stakeholders.88 States have also begun
to adopt the standards promulgated by the U.N. Guiding Principles
into their own domestic law.89 The U.N. Guiding Principles may be
83.

Veronika Haász, The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the
Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles, 14 HUM. RTS. REV. 165
(2013).

84.

Humberto Cantú Rivera, Corporate Accountability in the Field of Human
Rights: On Soft Law Standards and the Use of Extraterritorial Measures,
in DUTIES ACROSS BORDERS: ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS 109, 131 (Bård A. Andreassen & Võ Khánh Vinh
eds., 2016).

85.

Id. at 130.

86.

See NEWTON, supra note 2, at 67, 70 (arguing that “as multi-stakeholder
initiatives and international frameworks have become more established
and normative for business, the implications for corporations choosing not
to implement them, or implement them poorly, have grown. While there
may not be any legal implications for a corporation failing to implement
multi-stakeholder initiatives relevant to their enterprise, the implications
for a corporation’s reputation can be significant.”).

87.

Id. at 71.

88.

Mijares Pena, supra note 60.

89.

E.g., Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des
sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre (1) [Law 2017-399 of
March 27, 2017 on the Duty of Diligence of Parent Corporations and
Charitable Organizations of Category (1)], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 27,
2017 (instituting corporate regulations influenced by the U.N. Guiding
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considered, then, to be creating customary international law at the
margins, by exposing corporations to reputational risk if they do not
comply, which often has cascading effects leading to financial losses.90
By creating this deterrent effect for private actors, even nonbinding
principles and frameworks are approaching the force of customary
international law.
2. The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration

In December 2019, the Center for International Legal Cooperation
published the Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration
(“Hague Rules”).91 The Hague Rules, in modifying the Arbitration
Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
aim to create a non-state mechanism for the resolution of human rights
claims that are confined to arbitration, or not candidates for litigation.92
The publication of the Hague Rules further strengthened the growing
consensus that corporations should be held accountable for their
impacts on multiple stakeholders, including the people in countries in
which they operate.93 Notably, the Hague Rules explicitly disclaim that
they impose new legal obligations on States, or abrogate existing
obligations.94
There is likely a long road ahead before the international
arbitration regime fully reflects the needs of victims of human rights
abuses. Many host countries to multinational enterprises engage in
bilateral investment treaties for private investment that prevent host
States from any interference before or during investor activities, even
when the host State may know of ongoing human rights abuses.95 This
restriction—coupled with the fact that many host countries are lessdeveloped nations badly in need of the economic benefit from foreign
Principles into the domestic law of the French Republic). See generally
Chiara Macchi & Claire Bright, Hardening Soft Law: the Implementation
of Human Rights Due Diligence Requirements in Domestic Legislation, in
LEGAL SOURCES IN BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: EVOLVING DYNAMICS IN
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW 218–47 (Martina Buscemi et al. eds.,
2020) (discussing States’ adoption of domestic laws that developed after
the establishment of the U.N. Guiding Principles, and arguing that
domestic adoption is another method of transforming the soft law of the
U.N. Guiding Principles into customary international law).
90.

NEWTON, supra note 2, at 71.

91.

CTR. FOR INT’L LEGAL COOP., THE HAGUE RULES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS ARBITRATION (2019) [hereinafter HAGUE RULES].

92.

Id. at 1–2.

93.

Launch of the Hague Rules, supra note 5, at 1.

94.

HAGUE RULES, supra note 91, at pmbl., art. 5.

95.

Paré & Chong, supra note 57, at 915.
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investment—creates an imbalance of power that disincentivizes
enacting and enforcing domestic human rights laws.96

III. Analysis
A. The United States Approach: From Kiobel to Nestlé
1. Kiobel’s Antecedents

The Kiobel decision marked a turning point for victims of human
rights violations’ ability to seek tort claims in American courts for
actions carried out in foreign countries. However, prior to that ruling,
the ATS had been the source of jurisdiction for numerous foreign
plaintiffs in some successful tort claims against companies.97
Filártiga holds the distinction of being the first successful case
brought under ATS-created jurisdiction.98 In that case, Dolly Filártiga,
a Paraguayan applying for permanent political asylum in the United
States, successfully brought a tort claim against a man alleged to have
tortured and killed her brother in Paraguay.99 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that U.S. federal courts had
jurisdiction for the cause of action between an applicant for permanent
political asylum, Filártiga, and another asylum seeker, the alleged
torturer and murderer, despite the fact that the cause of action arose
in Paraguay, not the United States.100 Filártiga was a so-called “foreigncubed” case: brought by a foreign plaintiff, against a foreign defendant,
for a cause of action arising on foreign soil.101 In announcing the opinion
for the Second Circuit in that case, Judge Irving Kaufman noted that
the jurisdiction conferred by the ATS was proper, and that the ancient
law of nations that inspired the statute, as well as modern international
treaties, were the law of the United States.102
96.

Id.

97.

See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Luke D.
Anderson, An Exception to Jesner: Preventing U.S. Corporations and
Their Subsidiaries from Avoiding Liability for Harms Caused Abroad, 34
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 997, 998 (2020) (“[F]ollowing Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,
decided in 1980, the number of suits involving the ATS quickly
increased.”).

98.

Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 890.

99.

Id. at 878.

100. Id. at 878–80.
101. Duffy, supra note 62, at 34.
102. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 890 (“Among the rights universally proclaimed by
all nations, as we have noted, is the right to be free of physical torture.
Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become like the
pirate and slave trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all

400

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law VOL. 54 (2022)
A Regional Custos Morum? Corporate Liability Under International Law in North
America After Nevsun Resources and Nestlé

In Sosa v. Álvarez-Machaín, the Supreme Court of the United
States cautiously upheld the ATS’ viability as a mechanism to secure
jurisdiction for foreign nationals.103 The plaintiff in that case, Humberto
Álvarez-Machaín, alleged in part that his abduction in Mexico by the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) was tortious arbitrary
detention and he sought recovery under the ATS.104 Álvarez-Machaín
was suspected by the United States to have participated in the torture
and murder of an undercover DEA agent in Mexico, and was
consequently abducted by the DEA and brought to Texas to stand trial
in U.S. federal court.105 Ultimately, the case reached the Supreme Court,
which held that recovery was not possible under the ATS because the
claim arose under a norm that had not reached the force of customary
international law: arbitrary detention.106
Though Álvarez-Machaín had argued that the prohibition on
arbitrary detention was customary international law based on its
presence in both the UDHR107 and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,108 the Court found that neither formed part of
American law.109 The Court also voiced its concern that allowing causes
of action under violations of customary international law in federal
courts violated the doctrine, announced in Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins, that there is no federal common law in the United States.110
In its ruling in Sosa, the Court narrowed the ATS to causes of actions
that were either considered violations of the law of nations at the time
of the drafting of the Judiciary Act of 1789 or causes of action that
constitute direct modern analogues.111 This two-step test constricted the
ATS’ jurisdiction around the same time corporate and State interests
began to voice their opposition to any overbroad application of the
statute that might lead to liability for them.112 Under the Sosa test,
mankind. Our holding today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision
enacted by our First Congress, is a small but important step in the
fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.”).
103. Sosa v. Álvarez-Machaín, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
104. Id. at 698.
105. Id. at 697–98.
106. Id. at 735.
107. UDHR, supra note 27, at art. 9.
108. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
109. Sosa v. Álvarez-Machaín, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004).
110. Id. at 729; Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
111. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 694.
112. Travis, supra note 6, at 562.
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corporations could argue that because there was no international norm
for corporate liability at the time of drafting of the ATS, modern causes
of action against corporations for violations of international law were
barred. While the Supreme Court of the United States reaffirmed
corporate personhood in the controversial Citizens United decision,113
shortly thereafter it began to retreat from holding corporate entities
accountable under customary international law in federal courts
through ATS claims, before ultimately reaching a turning point in
Kiobel.114
2. Kiobel’s Central Holding and Consequences

In 2013, the Supreme Court, in its unanimous decision in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., announced that the ATS contained a
presumption against extraterritoriality, severely hampering the ability
of plaintiffs to recover for tort offenses committed outside the United
States.115 The Court limited claims brought under the ATS to those
that “touch and concern” the United States, significantly narrowing the
scope of the statute.116 In Kiobel, U.S. nationals, including named
plaintiff Esther Kiobel, sued a foreign corporation, Royal Dutch
Petroleum, for aiding and abetting violations of international law
through its operations in Nigeria.117 The Dutch oil corporation allegedly
sought the Nigerian Government’s help in silencing the protests of the
Ogoni people, of which Kiobel and her late husband were part, against
the continued environmental degradation of Ogoniland by its oil
exploration and production activities.118 The Nigerian military and
police forces allegedly responded with atrocities including “beating,
raping, killing, and arresting residents [of Ogoniland] and destroying or
looting property.”119 Kiobel’s late husband, part of the “Ogoni Nine,”
nine prominent activists against the corporation’s oil operations in
Nigeria, had been executed in these operations.120
113. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310, 326 (2010).
114. Tyler Becker, The Liability of Corporate Directors, Officers, and
Employees Under the Alien Tort Statute After Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC,
120 COLUM. L. REV 91, 97 (2020).
115. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013).
116. Anderson, supra note 97, at 998.
117. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 112.
118. Id. at 113.
119. Id.
120. Nigeria/Netherlands: Kiobel Witness Hearing Key Chance to Hold Shell
to Account Over Human Rights Abuses, AMNESTY INT’L (Oct. 8, 2019,
12:01 AM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/10/nigerianetherlands-kiobel-witness-hearing-key-chance-to-hold-shell-to-accountover-human-rights-abuses/ [https://perma.cc/VVC4-B7HT].
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In Kiobel, the Court found that because the defendant was a foreign
corporation and the relevant conduct that created the cause of action
took place in Nigeria, the case did not meet the standard that the claims
should “touch and concern” the domestic territory enough to rebut the
presumption against extraterritoriality.121 The only domestic presence
of Royal Dutch Petroleum, the defendant corporation, consisted of an
office in New York City that dealt with potential investors in the
company, rather than day-to-day oversight of extractive operations.122
Chief Justice Roberts, writing the Court’s opinion in Kiobel,
expressed the Court’s hesitation to adopt customary international law
in U.S. federal courts. Quoting Justice Story, who wrote “[n]o nation
has ever yet pretended to be the custos morum of the whole world”
nearly two centuries earlier, Roberts rebuffed the notion that the ATS
drafters meant to create such a role for the United States.123 Roberts
also expressed concerns about the foreign policy implications of holding
a foreign corporation liable in U.S. courts: “accepting petitioners’ view
would imply that other nations, also applying the law of nations, could
hale our citizens into their courts for alleged violations of the law of
nations occurring in the United States, or anywhere else in the world.”124
The appropriate decision-makers in such situations, he opined, were the
legislative and executive branches of the government.125 Justice Alito,
writing in a separate concurrence, also noted the Sosa test required
domestic conduct that violated an international law that was in definite
character and accepted among “civilized nations.”126
Human rights activists criticized the decision as the culmination of
decades of executive overreach into matters of international law, and a
further attempt to detach the law of nations from domestic law due to
sovereign immunity concerns.127 Before the Kiobel ruling, no appellate
court had challenged corporate liability under the ATS.128 The decision
underscored the vehement State and corporate resistance to

121. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 112.
122. Id. at 139.
123. Id. at 123.
124. Id. at 124.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 127 (Alito, J., concurring).
127. Travis, supra note 6, at 554–55 (“[The central holding] conflicts with the
original understanding of the law of nations as rules, enforceable under
federal common law and the ATS, that limit executive power so as to
promote peace.”).
128. Giannini & Farbstein, supra note 31, at 121.
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international law standards that might increase liability where before
there had been relative, if not absolute, impunity.129
But Kiobel was not fatal for the ATS. The concurring opinion by
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
suggested a test for the sufficient force necessary for a claim to “touch
and concern” the United States.130 Breyer would find jurisdiction under
the ATS if (1) the alleged tort occurs in the United States; (2) the
defendant is an American national; or (3) the defendant “substantially
and adversely affects an important American national interest,” which
included allowing the United States to harbor those who violate
international law.131 While Breyer did not agree with the majority’s
reasoning, he reached the same conclusion under the test he formed in
his concurrence: there was not “sufficient force” in Kiobel to justify
jurisdiction under the ATS.132
3. Kiobel’s Progeny

In 2018, another ATS case reached the high court, and the Supreme
Court of the United States had the chance to clarify its Kiobel
restriction. In Jesner v. Arab Bank, the Court held that foreign
corporations could not be sued in U.S. federal courts, even when the
plaintiff is a U.S. national.133 Joseph Jesner and other plaintiffs sought
damages under the ATS from Arab Bank, a Jordanian corporation with
a branch in New York, for the bank’s alleged complicity in terrorist
acts that harmed American citizens and nationals abroad.134 In Jesner,
as in Kiobel, the Court was reluctant to wade into political waters by
upholding a norm of international law that would allow foreign courts
to penalize conduct occurring in other countries.135 The Court was also
wary of the foreign policy headache that might arise from ruling that
actions outside U.S. territory violated international law.136
However, the winding road of Nestlé v. Doe suggests that there may
still be hope for the Alien Tort Statute. Nestlé v. Doe, decided June
2021 before the Supreme Court of the United States, is the culmination
of a long series of ATS litigation.137 The plaintiffs, former child slaves,
129. Stephens, supra note 8, at 1470.
130. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 127 (Breyer, J., concurring).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 140.
133. Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1390 (2018).
134. Id. at 1388.
135. Anderson, supra note 97, at 1006; Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1405.
136. Nestlé v. Doe Transcript, supra note 33, at 67.
137. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021).
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sued Nestlé and Cargill in U.S. federal court under the ATS after their
enslavement on Nestlé’s supplier cocoa farms in Côte d’Ivoire.138 In
2019, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the case
could proceed to the merits, and that the plaintiffs did have standing
as to the defendants, Cargill, who worked as a contractor for Nestlé,
and Nestlé USA, Inc. the U.S. operations base for the multinational
firm.139 Cargill and Nestlé appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, and
the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari, combining the two
cases.140 Justices heard oral arguments in December 2020 and handed
down a decision, discussed in greater detail below, in June 2021.141
B. Hudbay, Nevsun Resources, and the Canadian Approach

Canadian legal observers who had looked to the ATS as a potential
model for international law tort claims in Canadian courts were
disheartened, though not defeated, by the Kiobel decision.142 They had
cause to be optimistic, because the same year the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled in Kiobel, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice ruled that a series
of three cases brought by foreign plaintiffs, combined as Choc v. Hudbay
Materials, could proceed to trial on the merits.143
1. Choc v. Hudbay Materials

In Choc v. Hudbay Materials, Guatemalan members of the Mayan
Q’eqchi’ indigenous group alleged that a Canadian mining company,
which was later amalgamated into Hudbay Materials, was responsible
for human rights abuses in eastern Guatemala.144 The Mayan Q’eqchi’
sought to reinhabit their native land in the El Estor region of
Guatemala after earlier forcible evictions by nickel mining companies.145
By 2007, Hudbay’s predecessor company sought to exploit a land license
from the Guatemalan government and evict the Mayan Q’eqchi’
again.146 The plaintiffs alleged that Guatemalan police, military, and
138. Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013,1016 (9th Cir. 2014).
139. Doe v. Nestlé, S.A., 929 F.3d 623, 625 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted sub
nom. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021); Cargill, Inc. v. Doe
I, 141 S. Ct. 184 (2020), cert. granted sub nom. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe,
141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021).
140. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021).
141. Nestlé v. Doe Transcript, supra note 33; Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S.
Ct. 1931 (2021).
142. Duffy, supra note 62, at 36.
143. Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc., [2013] O.N.S.C. 1414 (Can.).
144. Id. at para. 4.
145. Id. at para. 10.
146. Id. at para. 5.
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private security personnel violently conducted the next round of
evictions, gang-raping eleven women.147 Protests over the disputed land
continued into fall 2009, when two other Mayan Q’eqchi’ community
leaders, Adolfo Ich and German Chub Choc, were killed and left
paralyzed, respectively, in two violent attacks.148
In July 2013, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice held, over the
defendant’s motions to dismiss, that the plaintiffs did have a cause of
action for a potentially novel tort claim against the company.149 Hudbay
did not appeal,150 so with the court’s holding, Hudbay become the first
such case to proceed to the trial phase in Canada to be decided on the
merits.151
2. Nevsun Resources v. Araya

The victory for human rights advocates in Hudbay carried
momentum into the litigation of Nevsun Resources v. Araya.152 As the
Supreme Court for British Columbia deliberated the decision in Nevsun
Resources v. Araya before it reached the Canadian Supreme Court,
scholar E. Samuel Farkas noted that the violations in that case clearly
met the standard for customary international law violation and should
be considered a sufficient tort action in Canada.153
The plaintiffs in Nevsun brought their case in British Columbia,
alleging, like the plaintiffs in Hudbay, they had been forced into labor
for a domestically-headquartered corporation.154 Over 1,000 plaintiffs,
refugees and former Eritrean nationals, sought damages for breaches of
domestic torts and breaches of customary international law, claiming
that they were forced into labor as part of their conscription into the
Eritrean military.155 They alleged that they were made to work in the
Bisha mine, a majority-owned subsidiary of Nevsun Resources, a
Canadian company, and that their involuntary labor violated
customary international law prohibitions on cruel, inhuman or

147. Id.
148. Id. at paras. 6–7.
149. Id. at para. 75.
150. Duffy, supra note 62, at 26.
151. Mijares Pena, supra note 60, at 13.
152. Contra Farkas, supra note 67, at 144.
153. Id. at 139–41.
154. Nevsun Res. Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5, paras. 3, 7, [2020] 443 D.L.R.
4th (Can.).
155. Id. at para. 4.
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degrading treatment, slavery, forced labor, and crimes against
humanity.156
Nevsun Resources responded by denying that the lower court of
British Columbia, where the plaintiffs first brought their complaint,
had jurisdiction to hear the case.157 The corporation argued for the lack
of jurisdiction in part because of Canada’s act of state doctrine and
partly because customary international law, it argued, did not create a
cause of action in domestic courts.158 When the lower court denied
Nevsun Resources’ motions, the corporation appealed to the Canadian
Supreme Court.159
In a narrow majority, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
act of state doctrine was not part of Canadian common law.160 In
English common law, the common ancestor of American and Canadian
common law, the act of state doctrine traditionally “holds the national
court incompetent to adjudicate upon the lawfulness of the sovereign
acts of a foreign state.”161 However, English and Canadian courts in the
twenty-first century found the doctrine substantially diluted in several
circumstances, including where there is a violation of international
law.162 This had the effect, in Canadian courts, of completely swallowing
the act of state doctrine in favor of respect for public international
law.163
The Court also held that private actors’ violations of customary
international law, as incorporated in Canadian common law, could
create causes of action in Canadian courts.164 The claims that the
plaintiffs brought in Nevsun, of forced labor, slavery, and inhumane
treatment, decisively fit into the body of norms of modern customary
international law.165 Justice Abella, writing the opinion for the Court,
noted that in some States (like the United States), customary
156. Id. at paras. 3–6, 13 (“[Araya] says he was required to work 6 days a week
from 5:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., often outside in temperatures approaching 50
degrees Celsius.”).
157. Id. at para. 16.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at para. 59.
161. Id. at para. 29.
162. Id. at paras. 37–44; 58 (“To now import the English act of state doctrine
and jurisprudence into Canadian law would be to overlook the
development that its underlying principles have received through
considered analysis by Canadian courts.”).
163. Id. at para. 45.
164. Id. at para. 127.
165. Id. at para. 75.
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international law became part of domestic law through executive and
legislative action.166 In Canada, however, the doctrine of adoption
operated to make customary international law domestic common law
by adopting norms of international law into the domestic legal
system.167 The adoption doctrine in this form traced its roots as far back
as Blackstone’s writings.168
But Nevsun Resources argued that even if customary international
law did create causes of action in Canadian courts, corporations are not
liable.169 In response, the Supreme Court of Canada held that under
customary international law, private actors, as well as States, face
liability.170 Justice Abella conceded that Nevsun Resources had
correctly interpreted classical international law, which, as discussed
above, viewed States and not corporations as the primary actors.171
However, she characterized the corporation’s position as a
misunderstanding of modern international law, in which “there is no
longer any tenable basis for restricting the application of customary
international law to relations between states.”172 Having found that
Canadian courts have jurisdiction over domestic corporations in
breaches of customary international law committed in a foreign State,
the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed Nevsun Resources’ appeal and
allowed the tort case to proceed to the merits in the court of British
Columbia.173

IV. Discussion
A. Nestlé v. Doe: Trying to Define ‘Sufficient Force’

Rather than slamming a door shut, the decision in Kiobel left a
breadcrumb trail for potential plaintiffs under the ATS in the United
States. This trail has most recently been followed by the plaintiffs in
Nestlé v. Doe.174 In Kiobel, the Court announced its wariness of the U.S.
166. Id. at para. 85 (citing Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process,
75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 204 (1996)).
167. Id. at para. 86.
168. Id. at para. 87 (“Blackstone’s 1769 Commentaries on the Laws of England:
Book the Fourth, for example, noted that ‘the law of nations . . . is here
adopted in it[s] full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part
of the law of the land.’”).
169. Id. at para. 104.
170. Id. at para. 107.
171. Id. at para. 104.
172. Id. at para. 107.
173. Id. at para. 6.
174. See generally Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021).
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judiciary interfering in the foreign policy powers delegated to the
executive and legislative branches in the U.S. government, and found
no explicit indication in the text of the ATS that it should apply to
violations of the law of nations committed extraterritorially.175
However, Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the unanimous court noted
that “even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the
United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application.”176 “Sufficient force”
was left undefined.
In Nestlé v. Doe, by contrast, the Ninth Circuit began to elaborate
the definition of “sufficient force,” holding that sufficient connection to
the domestic territory of the United States existed when there was
significant contact between a U.S. corporation and its foreign
subsidiary.177 In that case, Judge Nelson noted that “[e]very major
operational decision regarding [defendant Nestlé’s] United States
market is made in or approved in the United States” and defendant
Cargill’s business is “headquartered in [and] . . . centralized in
Minneapolis and decisions about buying and selling commodities are
made at its Minneapolis headquarters.”178 Although the Ninth Circuit
found sufficient force in the connection between the United States and
the cause of action, both Nestlé and Cargill successfully appealed the
decision, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
to hear the case and determine its justiciability in U.S. federal courts.179
1. Oral Arguments in Nestlé v. Doe

In Supreme Court oral arguments, the Justices appeared to
challenge both the presumption against corporate liability that the
defendants sought to support, and to suggest that the defendants’
presence in the United States touched and concerned the domestic
territory with sufficient force. Justice Breyer plainly stated that he did
not see why domestic corporations should be exempt from liability for
violations of customary international law.180 Justice Alito also expressed
his skepticism that U.S. courts were an inappropriate forum rather
indignantly:
So suppose a U.S. corporation makes a big show of supporting
every cause de jure but then surreptitiously hires agents in Africa
175. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115, 124 (2013).
176. Id. at 125.
177. Nestlé v. Doe, S.A., 929 F.3d 623, 638 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub
nom. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021).
178. Id. at 638.
179. Id. at 177.
180. Nestlé v. Doe Transcript, supra note 33, at 11–12.
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to kidnap children and keep them in bondage on a plantation so
that the corporation can buy cocoa or coffee or some other
agricultural product at bargain prices. You would say that the
victims who couldn’t possibly get any recovery in the courts of
the country where they had been held should be thrown out of
court in the United States, where this corporation is
headquartered and does business?181

Justice Sotomayor echoed Justice Alito’s argument to express
dismay that a U.S. corporation should not be held liable for acts
committed in the United States to aid and abet violations of
international law.182 Justice Kagan explicitly drew on the approach of
several foreign States, including Canada, to the issue, and hinted that
the corporate headquarters’ presence in the United States met the
sufficient force standard from Kiobel.183
Distinguishing Nestlé from Jesner, the Justices were not persuaded
of any foreign policy consideration in the case that would warrant
judicial restraint under Sosa. Chief Justice Roberts doubted that
foreign states would take issue with U.S. courts addressing violations
of customary international law by U.S. corporations.184 Justice
Kavanaugh also joined in this skepticism, which Deputy Solicitor
General Curtis Gannon, appearing on behalf of the United States as
amicus curiae for the defendants, conceded was well-founded.185
Finally, the Justices challenged the contention that aiding and
abetting child slavery, the charge against the U.S. corporations, was
not prohibited by customary international law. The defendants argued
that while prohibition of child slavery was a universal norm under
customary international law, prohibition of aiding and abetting child
slavery, which the U.S. corporations were alleged to have done, was
not.186

181. Id. at 13–14.
182. Id. at 43.
183. Id. at 44 (“[M]any of the countries around the world with the strongest
rule of law systems do hold their own corporations civilly liable for the
kinds of actions at issue here.”).
184. Id. at 6.
185. Id. at 47.
186. Id. at 9.
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2. The Predictive Value of Oral Arguments187

Academic analyses of oral arguments have yielded limited
predictive trends. Empirical studies show that the more Justices asked
side questions, the more likely they were to vote against that side.188
More recently, the use of artificial intelligence aided research on the
effect of questioning and speech patterns for different Justices.189 The
most recent series of oral arguments, which included Nestlé v. Doe, was
historically unique: due to the distancing measures in place because of
the coronavirus pandemic, arguments were entirely telephonic for the
first time in the Supreme Court’s history.190 Consequently, before the
Court issued its final decision, there was no certainty that the patterns
that emerged in oral arguments before the pandemic would hold, due
to the absence of verbal cues and in-person observations, and the
addition of potential digital and telephonic interference.
However, observers could still make some predictions from the
current state of the Nestlé litigation. First, analyzing oral arguments
under the pre-pandemic formula, the questioning appeared to favor the
respondent, arguing on behalf of the plaintiffs, with twenty-six
questions; Justices asked the petitioner, the defendants, thirty-four
questions.191 Next, and more importantly for the future of ATS
litigation, several themes emerged that hinted at the Justices’
perspectives. To begin with, the Court appeared to be skeptical that
domestic corporations should be exempt from liability for violations of
customary international law.192 In addition, the Justices seemed to
imply that domestic corporations’ operations in the United States do
187. This Note was first written before the Nestlé decision was published and
still includes this analysis of the unique COVID-19 era of oral arguments
before the U.S. Supreme Court. Further research into the predictive value
of oral arguments before the high court under these circumstances may
be of interest to scholars.
188. Adam Liptak, When the Justices Ask Questions, Be Prepared to Lose the
Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/
26/us/26bar.html [https://perma.cc/Q6BE-BAZY] (“The bottom line, as
simple as it sounds . . . is that the party that gets the most questions is
likely to lose.”); see also Timothy R. Johnson et al., Inquiring Minds Want
to Know: Do Justices Tip Their Hands with Questions at Oral Argument
in the U.S. Supreme Court?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241 (2009).
189. See Gregory M. Dickinson, A Computational Analysis of Oral Argument
in the Supreme Court, 28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 449 (2019).
190. Adam Liptak, Virus Pushes a Staid Supreme Court into Revolutionary
Changes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
05/03/us/politics/supreme-court-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/57GX-U7D2].
191. See Nestlé v. Doe Transcript, supra note 33.
192. See id. at 6, 37.
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sufficiently touch and concern the United States when operations in the
territory aid and abet violation of customary international law
abroad.193 The Court also felt more comfortable applying the ATS when
there are scant foreign policy implications of doing so, which is likely
to be the case when the defendant is a U.S. corporation.194 Though
counsel for both sides struggled when addressing the Justices on this
point, the Justices suggested that aiding and abetting a violation of
customary international law, as the defendants were alleged to have
done with child slavery in Côte d’Ivoire, is sufficient to come under the
jurisdiction of the ATS.195
3. The Summer 2021 Ruling

Any analysis of an oral argument before a final decision is
speculative, but before the Court ruled in Nestlé v. Doe the questions
posed by the Justices revealed their willingness to apply the ATS if the
circumstances warrant. When a domestic defendant acts in violation of
customary international law, and there is no foreign policy
consideration to warrant intervention from the executive or legislative
branches, the U.S. judiciary is prepared to exercise its ATS jurisdiction
over the matter. However, it was not prepared to do so in Nestlé v.
Doe. Writing for the majority in an 8–1 decision, Justice Thomas
concluded that the plaintiffs could not proceed to the merits on the
case because the cause of action did not sufficiently touch and concern
the United States, making any application of the ATS impermissibly
extraterritorial.196 Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held
that the types of decisions made by Nestlé USA and Cargill on the
territory of the United States did not rise to international law
violations.197 General corporate activity and decision-making did not
constitute aiding and abetting a violation of international law, so the
corporations headquartered in the United States were not sufficiently
connected to the forced labor actions in Côte d’Ivoire.198

193. Id. at 39.
194. See id. at 6.
195. See id. at 9.
196. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1993 (2021).
197. Id. at 1937.
198. Id.; see also Simon Baughen, U.S. Companies Win Aiding and Abetting
ATS Case in U.S. Supreme Court; But ATS Not Dead Yet, INT’L MAR.
& COM. L. (July 6, 2021), https://iistl.blog/2021/07/06/us-companieswin-aiding-and-abetting-ats-case-in-us-supreme-court-but-ats-not-deadyet/ [https://perma.cc/A9AK-SYEB].
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The decision may have brought an end to the proceedings for Nestlé
v. Doe, but rumors of the ATS’ death have been greatly exaggerated.199
In the decision, only two other Justices joined Justice Thomas in the
part of his opinion where he denied that the ATS created a cause of
action for modern international law torts, arguing only that it created
jurisdiction for violations of the three torts articulated in the text.200
Justice Sotomayor, in a concurrence joined by Justices Breyer and
Kagan, wrote that this view was “unmoored from both history and
precedent,”201 leading observers to conclude that the majority of the
Supreme Court remains prepared to extend ATS jurisdiction to
violations of customary international law not originally identified by
the drafters of the ATS.202
Interestingly, and most relevantly for this analysis, the Court did
not settle the very question for which certiorari was granted in Nestlé
v. Doe, whether there is a reason to distinguish between corporate
persons and natural persons as defendants in ATS cases.203 Justice
Alito, who had been vocal during oral arguments in his viewpoint that
they should not be distinguishable, dissented from the majority for this
reason.204 Justice Gorsuch, in a concurring opinion, found “[t]he notion
that corporations are immune from suit under the ATS cannot be
reconciled with the statutory text and original understanding” of the
statute.205
199. See also Cassens Weiss, infra note 219; Jimmy Hoover & Jennifer
Doherty, Supreme Court Rules for Nestle, Cargill in Child Labor Suit,
LAW360 (June 17, 2021, 10:41 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1395086/ [https://perma.cc/B4HH-RETV] (discussing the intentions of
the plaintiffs’ counsel to amend their briefings and continue litigation in
a new phase of the court battle).
200. Nestlé USA, Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 1937.
201. Id. at 1945.
202. Justine N. Stefanelli, SCOTUS Judgment in Alien Tort Statute Case
Issued Today (June 17, 2021, 4:01 PM), AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.,
https://www.asil.org/ILIB/scotus-judgment-alien-tort-statute-caseissued-today [https://perma.cc/ZTD2-ME5P].
203. William S. Dodge, The Surprisingly Broad Implications of Nestlé USA,
Inc. v. Doe for Human Rights Litigation and Extraterritoriality, JUST SEC.
(June 18, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/77012/the-surprisinglybroad-implications-of-nestle-usa-inc-v-doe-for-human-rights-litigationand-extraterritoriality/ [https://perma.cc/M3UT-QNNB].
204. Nestlé USA, Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 1950; Beth Van Schaack, Nestle & Cargill
v. Doe: What’s Not in the Supreme Court’s Opinion, JUST SEC. (June 30,
2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/77120/nestle-cargill-v-doe-whatsnot-in-the-supreme-courts-opinions/ [https://perma.cc/S8JN-DPNJ].
205. Id. at 1940; see also Amy Howe, Justices Scuttle Lawsuit Against Nestlé,
Cargill for Allegedly Aiding Child Slavery Abroad, SCOTUSBLOG (June 17,
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In the section below, this Note suggests how the ATS’ survival in
U.S. courts may be inextricably linked to the growing acceptance of
corporate liability tort liability for international law violations in
Canada and elsewhere, through transnational judicial dialogue.
B. Transnational Judicial Dialogue and a New Test for Liability

The mention of the ATS by the Canadian Supreme Court’s Nevsun
Resources majority opinion, and the American Supreme Court Justices’
interest in foreign legal approaches to tort liability for corporations in
Nestlé v. Doe, evoke a legal phenomenon recognized as transnational
judicial dialogue.206 Professor Melissa Waters has called this “the
synergistic relationship between international human rights law and
domestic courts participating in judicial dialogue” where
“[i]nternational legal norms . . . provide courts with common reference
points around which to shape a dialogue.”207
Evidence for this transnational judicial dialogue between Canada
and the United States recently emerged in three ways. First, there is
direct reference to the other state’s practice in court proceedings.
Justice Abella, who wrote the opinion for the 5–4 court in Nevsun
Resources v. Araya, referenced the ATS when analyzing current
international standards.208 In Nestlé v. Doe oral arguments, Justice
Kagan was one of several justices noting foreign practices on tort
liability, referencing Canada’s approach to tort liability for corporations
under customary international law.209 Justice Breyer, who wrote in his
concurring opinion in Kiobel that it would be beneficial for the United
States to model foreign courts’ approaches to tort liability for
corporations, also reiterated this interest during oral arguments.210
Transnational judicial dialogue also occurred through the amici and
intervenors that provided legal submissions in each litigation in both
countries. In both Nevsun Resources and Nestlé, Justices cited the
research of international diplomats and foreign government leaders

2021, 1:36 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/06/justices-scuttlelawsuit-against-nestle-cargill-for-allegedly-aiding-child-slavery-abroad/
[https://perma.cc/2X32-SYMK].
206. Melissa A. Waters, The Future of Transnational Judicial Dialogue, 104
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 465, 466 (2010).
207. Id.
208. Nevsun Res. Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5, para. 113, [2020] 443 D.L.R. 4th
(Can.).
209. Nestlé v. Doe Transcript, supra note 33, at 44.
210. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 136 (2013); Nestlé v.
Doe Transcript, supra note 33, at 37.
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represented by Yale University Professor Harold Koh.211 EarthRights
International, an American nonprofit legal organization, wrote an
amicus brief for the plaintiffs in Nestlé when the case appeared before
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and was an Intervener for
the plaintiffs, presenting an explanation of the ATS to the Canadian
judges, when Nevsun Resources v. Araya went to the Court of Appeal
for British Columbia.212 Finally, there is evidence that transnational
judicial dialogue emerged as a result of the post-World War II
international human rights legal regime, like the U.N. Guiding
Principles, hardening into international jus cogens norms.213
As a result of this transnational judicial dialogue, the standard for
tort liability for corporations appears to be approaching an average set
of standards—in North America and beyond—that may determine a
new test for corporate liability for human rights violations.214 The
majority reasoning in Nevsun, and the various opinions in the Nestlé
decision, approach a common consensus that private actors—including
corporations, as legal persons—can be held liable for tort violations in
domestic courts whose laws include violations of customary
international law. While Kiobel left vague the requirements of the
defendants’ connection to the domestic court in these cases, the decision
of the Canadian Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit’s formulations
suggest that two broad categories constitute sufficient force: (1)
knowing or reckless violation of customary international law by a
domestic corporation or subsidiary of the corporation and (2) control
of the domestic corporation or subsidiary of the corporation over the
action of the actor ultimately committing the violation. When
211. See Brief of Former Gov’t Off. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I, Cargill, Inc. v. Doe I (Nos. 19416 & 19-453), 2020 WL 6292567; Nevsun, 2020 SCC 5 at para. 85.
212. See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae EarthRights Int’l in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013 (9th
Cir. 2015) (No. 10-56739), 2011 WL 2679957, at *2–3; see generally
Factum of Intervener EarthRights Int’l, Araya v. Nevsun Res. Ltd., [2017]
B.C.C.A. 401 (Can.).
213. Nestlé v. Doe Transcript, supra note 33, at 41; Nevsun Res. Ltd. v. Araya,
2020 SCC 5, para. 115, [2020] 443 D.L.R. 4th (Can.).
214. See Clare Connellan et al., Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell Plc: UK Supreme
Court Allows Nigerian Citizens’ Environmental Damage Claim to
Proceed Against UK Parent Company, WHITE & CASE LLP (Feb. 19,
2021), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/okpabi-v-royaldutch-shell-plc-uk-supreme-court-allows-nigerian-citizens
[https://perma.cc/Z9Q8-QC23], for an example from the Supreme Court
of the United Kingdom that illustrates the trend toward corporate
accountability for parent companies, and a discussion of the corporate risk
that parent companies should mitigate in international supply chains in
the future to comply with these standards.
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corporations meet these standards, domestic courts have the
jurisdiction to hear tort claims rooted in customary international law.215
In Nestlé, the complaint did not sufficiently allege the defendant
companies’ knowledge of the illegal conduct to trigger ATS
application.216 But even Justice Thomas, who favored the most
restrictive interpretation, shied away from dealing the ATS a death
blow.217 It survives with an uncertain future—but in a markedly
different international law context—where there is a trend toward
corporate accountability.218

V. Conclusion
The latest decisions from the North American high courts impact
the efficacy of customary international law to bring corporations to
justice for human rights abuses. The legal trends in North America,
coupled with the growing body of treaty law and norms emerging from
multilateral actors like the United Nations, create a norm against
corporate impunity which will make it more difficult for corporations
to evade liability internationally and domestically. Regardless of the
limited rulings against corporations, for practitioners, the writing is on
the wall: multinational corporations must monitor their supply chains
or they will face consequences that can include years of litigation.219
The shift that emerged from the Canadian Supreme Court in
Nevsun, and the U.S. Supreme Court in Nestlé, will likely shape the
way customary international law is upheld in domestic fora. To be
215. Nestlé v. Doe Transcript, supra note 33, at 24; Nevsun, SCC 5 at paras.
119–21.
216. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1937 (2021); Supreme Court
Limits Extraterritorial Reach of The Alien Tort Statute, GIBSON DUNN
(June 17, 2021), https://www.gibsondunn.com/supreme-court-limitsextraterritorial-reach-of-the-alien-tort-statute/ [https://perma.cc/72AVSC9J] (“Plaintiffs bringing suit under the ATS must establish a strong,
domestic nexus for their claim. It is not sufficient for plaintiffs merely to
allege general corporate decisionmaking in the United States.”).
217. Nestlé USA, Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 1936.
218. Kayla Winarsky Green & Timothy McKenzie, Looking Without and
Looking Within: Nestlé v. Doe and the Legacy of the Alien Tort Statute,
25 ASIL INSIGHTS, July 15, 2021, at 1, 6.
219. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Afternoon Briefs: SCOTUS Tosses Child
Slavery Case; DOJ Drops Suit and Probe Over Bolton Book,
ABAJOURNAL.COM (June 17, 2021, 3:48 PM), https://www.abajournal.
com/news/article/afternoon-briefs-scotus-tosses-child-slavery-case-dojdrops-suit-and-probe-over-bolton-book [https://perma.cc/NSJ5-DGYU]
(noting the counsel for the plaintiffs in Nestlé v. Doe plan to file an
amended complaint: the court battle is far from over for Nestlé and
Cargill).
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successful in litigating a tort claim against a corporation arising under
international law in domestic courts requires a systematic explanation
of not just the law’s connection to the domestic judiciary, but also the
defendant corporation’s connection to the domestic fora.
These rulings also have massive implications for corporations. The
North American high courts’ willingness to allow tort liability suits
against corporations, coupled with other nations’ approaches toward
codifying corporate liability in line with the U.N. Guiding Principles,
should raise concerns for multinational corporations.220 It is becoming
more costly for corporations to take legally dubious shortcuts—
knowingly or recklessly—in the court of public opinion and in domestic
courts.221 Amid increasing calls for transparency and accountability in
supply chain management, corporations risk trapping themselves and
their subsidiaries or agents in decades of litigation by neglecting these
legal developments.222 By poorly monitoring their supply chain,
corporations also risk their reputational standing even if they manage,
like Nestlé and Cargill, to win in court.223 They provide consumers, who
have greater access to supply chain information than ever before, an
incentive to buy from other companies.224

220. See generally Macchi & Bright, supra note 89, for a discussion of how
States incorporated U.N. Guiding Principles into domestic law.
221. Villena & Gioia, supra note 17. See generally Sabine Michalowski, Doing
Business with a Bad Actor: How to Draw the Line Between Legitimate
Commercial Activities and Those That Trigger Corporate Complicity
Liability, 50 TEX. INT’L L. J. 403 (2015) (discussing of the mens rea
required in various jurisdictions, including the United States, to trigger a
finding of aiding and abetting liability).
222. See Rechtbank Den Haag 1 mei 2019, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2019: 4233
(Neth.) (affirming jurisdiction for the plaintiffs in Kiobel to sue Royal
Dutch Petroleum in the Netherlands, where the company is
headquartered, as litigation in this case stretches into a third decade).
223. E.g., Joseph Stiglitz & Geoffrey Heal, Opinion: Savor Your Chocolate.
Enjoy Your Dividends. Enslaved Children May Have Grown the Cocoa
That Made It All Possible, MARKETWATCH (July 13, 2021, 7:05 AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/savor-your-chocolate-enjoy-yourdividends-enslaved-children-may-have-grown-the-cocoa-that-made-it-allpossible-1162612387%E2%80%A6 [https://perma.cc/335N-X2RB].
224. See e.g., PETER M. GERHART, TORT LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 206–08
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010). The supply chain disruptions of the
coronavirus pandemic also brought to the fore a number of new services
to monitor, and increase the transparency of, supply chains in real time.
Consequently, companies may not be able to plead ignorance of any
human rights violations in their supply chain, or their subsidiaries’ supply
chains. See, e.g., Sustainability, PROJECT44, https://www.project44.com
/sustainability [https://perma.cc/6VQU-WG8W], for the socially conscious
pledge of such a service.
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Most importantly, it is past time for definite standards to emerge
to support victims of human rights abuses. Arguments that host
countries are the most appropriate forum for claims are persuasive only
until matched with the reality that host countries with populations
vulnerable to human rights abuses often lack the legal infrastructure to
hold perpetrators accountable.225 If the United States fails to hold
accountable corporations that do business with human rights abusers
in their supply chains, the State may be seen as a poor partner in
treaties or trade.226 Further, as many scholars and jurists have
acknowledged, it is preferable to address violations of human rights law
in criminal proceedings.227 Nestlé and Cargill, despite the favorable
ruling in summer 2021, still condemned the use of child slavery in their
supply chains without acknowledging their own fault.228 Judge Posner
noted the absurdity of imagining war criminals like the Nazis charged
with committing torts like “wrongful death, false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, conversion, trespass,
medical malpractice, or other torts,” implying that the banal nature of
these tort actions does not capture the severity of human rights
abuses.229 However, when the alternative to civil proceedings is not
criminal proceedings, but impunity, it is even more important that
victims are able to seek redress via tort proceedings in a foreign forum.
Though no nation in the world has yet become a custos morum, the
jurisprudence from North America suggests that a regional force may
well be emerging.

225. Tara L. Van Ho, ‘Band-Aids Don’t Fix Bullet Holes’: In Defence of a
Traditional State-Centric Approach, in THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR A UN
TREATY 111, 112 (Jernej Letnar Černič & Nicolás Carrillo-Santarelli eds.,
2020); Thompson et al., supra note 30, at 842.
226. Oona Hathaway, Oral Argument 2.0: Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I, OYEZ
(2020), https://argument2.oyez.org/2020/nestle-usa-inc-v-doe-i/
[https://perma.cc/P5NE-PKXG].
227. See Kelly, supra note 16, at 340 (discussing the historical roots of criminal
liability for corporations, and its present-day limitations with regard to
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